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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
TAXATION: State Tax Regulation of Cigarettes Sold on Reservations
Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2028 (1994)
Milhelm Attea & Brothers, Inc. (the Wholesalers) brought suit against the
Department of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York (the
Department). The Wholesalers sought to enjoin a regulatory scheme which
required cigarette wholesalers to keep records of transactions' and which
limited quantities of cigarettes sold to tax-exempt Indian retailers.' The
Wholesalers claimed that the regulatory scheme was preempted by the federal
Indian Trader Statutes
The United States Supreme Court held that "Indian traders are not wholly
immune from state regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment
or collection of lawful state taxes."4 The Court further held that New York's
regulatory scheme was not, on its face, unduly burdensome.5
The State of New York lacks authority to tax cigarettes sold on
reservations to enrolled tribal members for their own consumption.6 The State
is entitled, however, to tax reservation cigarette sales to consumers who are
not tribal members.7 To insure that nonmember consumers did not escape the
1. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 336.6(g)(3-4) (1992).
2. Id. § 336.7.
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1988). Section 261 provides:
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and authority to appoint
traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just
and proper specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods
shall be sold to the Indians.
Id. § 261. The Milhelm Attea Court explained in a footnote:
[O]ther Indian Trader provisions state that persons who establish their fitness to trade with
Indians to the BIA's satisfaction shall be permitted to do so, 25 U.S.C. § 262, authorize
the President to prohibit the introduction of goods into Indian country and to revoke
licenses, § 263, and impose penalties for unauthorized trading, § 264. BIA regulations
under the statutes are codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 140.1-140.26 (1993).
Milhein Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2034 n.7.
4. Milhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2036.
5. Id. at 2037.
6. Id. at 2031 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservations, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81 (1976)).
7. Milhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2031 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
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sta.te tax, the Department adopted a state tax regulation scheme which limited
the quantity of untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers could sell to tax-exempt
Indian retailers!
The Department developed quotas for authorized sales which were
calculated to parallel the "probable demand" of tax-exempt Indian
consumers.9 Sales quotas were to be based on data submitted from the tribe,
or on per capita cigarette consumption rates of New York State residents."
Wholesalers who sold quantities beyond the quota were to assess the tribe or
tribal retailer for the state tax."
The Department's other regulations placed additional record-keeping
burdens on the wholesalers. Under the regulations, wholesalers are required
to obtain the Department's approval before selling untaxed cigarettes.1
2
Further, wholesalers who planned to sell tax-exempt cigarettes to Indian tribes
or reservation retailers bore the responsibility of ensuring that: (1) the buyer
intends to distribute the cigarettes to tax-exempt consumers; 3 (2) the buyer
takes delivery on the reservation; 4 and (3) the buyer holds a valid state tax
exemption certificate."
The United States Supreme Court observed that the Wholesaler's claim
constituted a facial attack on the Department's regulations. 6 The Wholesalers
challenged the Department's authority to impose the regulations, but the
Wholesalers did not challenge specific features of the regulations
themselves. 7 This conclusion led the Court to limit its review of the case in
two ways: First, the Supreme Court proceeded with the assumption that the
Department's quota on untaxed cigarettes would allow quantities of untaxed
cigarettes sufficient to meet the legitimate consumption needs of Indians on
the reservation. 8 Second, the Court declined to assess all features of the
regulations and their impact on tribal sovereignty. Rather, the Court limited
Re;ervation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)).
8. The Department alleged that the volume of tax-exempt cigarettes sold on New York
Indian reservations in 1987-88, if consumed exclusively by tax-exempt Indians, would represent
a consumption rate 20 times that of average New York residents. The State estimated lost
revenue of up to $65 million per year. Id. at 2031 (citing Record at 244-46, Milhelm Attea (No.
93-377) (affidavit of Jamie Woodward)).
9. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 336.7(d)(i) (1992).
10. Id. §§ 336.7(d)(1), (d)(2)(ii).
11. Id. §§ 336.7(b)(2), (e).
12. Mlhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2032.
13. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, §§ 336.6(d)(1), 336.6(0(1), 336.7(0(1) (1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Milhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2033.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2033.
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its decision to whether the regulations conflicted with the Indian Trader
Statutes.'
The Milhelm Attea Court explained that the Indian Trader Statutes were
enacted with the purpose of preventing fraudulent behavior on the part of
persons trading with Indians.' In a 1965 decision, Warren Trading Post Co.
v. Arizona Tax Commission, the Supreme Court specified that federal
legislation controlled Indian trading to the extent that all state regulation of
Indian traders was invalid.2'
The Supreme Court recognized that many of its decisions following
Warren Trading Post had upheld state regulations and, in so doing, had
"undermined" much of the Warren Trading Post principle.' The Court
specifically referred to Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservations," Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,'
and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe.?
In Moe, Colville, and Citizen Band the Supreme Court recognized the
states' valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxation. The Court
distinguished between laws involved direct taxation of Indian traders for trade
with Indians, and those which enforced lawful taxation of non-Indians.
The Supreme Court concluded that, after balancing state, federal, and tribal
interests, state regulation may be justified when the legislation protects
legitimate state interest in taxation of non-Indians. The Court will inquire
whether the burden placed on reservation retailers is minimal and
appropriately tailored to the legitimate state interest in enforcing taxation of
non-Indians."
The Milhelm Attea Court noted that tax enforcement schemes were upheld
in Moe and Colville, even though the schemes impacted reservation retailers
directly. Consequently, the Court found it reasonable to impose similar
schemes on non-Indian wholesalers: "It would be anomalous to hold that a
19. Id. at 2033-34.
20. Id. at 2034.
21. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685,690 (1965) ("Congress
has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains
for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.").
22. Milheln Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2034.
23. 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (upholding Montana law requiring Indian tribal sellers to
collect a cigarette tax validly imposed on non-Indians), cited in MilhelmAttea, 114 S. Ct. at 2034.
24. 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (upholding Washington State cigarette tax regulatory scheme
and rejecting argument that tribes could use tax exemption to create market from consumers who
would normally do business elsewhere), cited in Milhelm Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2034-35.
25. 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the State
of Oklahoma from suing Tribes to recover cigarette taxes owed for transactions between tribal-
owned smoke shop and non-Indians, but permitting Oklahoma to collect from wholesalers), cited
in Milheln Atlea, 114 S. Ct. at 2035.
26. MilheIn Attea, 114 S. Ct. at 2035.
27. Id. at 2035-36.
No. 2]
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State could impose tax collection and bookkeeping burdens on reservation
retailers who are themselves enrolled tribal members, including stores
operated by the tribes themselves, but that similar burdens could not be
imposed on wholesalers, who often (as in this case) are not."'
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the policy
requiring reservation retailers to obtain tax-exempt certificates from the State
invades the Bureau of Indian Affair's sole power to appoint Indian traders."
The Court found that the regulation did not vest authority to trade with
Indians; it merely served to identify entities who were already selling
cigarettes. Therefore, the regulation did not infringe upon the Bureau's
power."
DIMINISHMENT OF RESERVATION LAND: Effect of Opening
Reservations to Non-Indian Settlement
Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994)
The issue before the Supreme Court in Hagen was whether the Uintah
Indian Reservation had been diminished by Congress when the reservation
was opened to non-Indian settlement in 1905. Hagen, an Indian, was charged
with illegal possession of a controlled substance in Myton, Utah. Because
Myton was within the original boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation,
Hagen argued that the alleged offense occurred in "Indian country.""
According to Hagen, the Utah state court, then, was without criminal
jurisdiction."
The trial court denied Hagen's motion. However, the state appellate court
reversed, holding that Myton is in Indian country and, therefore, Utah's courts
do not have jurisdiction.33 The state appellate court based its conclusions on
a Tenth Circuit decision which found that the Uintah Indian Reservation had
not been diminished in 1905, when the land was opened to non-Indian
settlement.O Ultimately, the state supreme court reversed, holding that the
Uintah Reservation had been diminished by the 1905 opening of the
reservation. The Utah Supreme Court found that the town of Myton is located
outside of the reservation's boundaries, and Hagen was thus subject to the
Slate's criminal jurisdiction for acts committed in Myton." Hagen then
28. Id. at 2036.
29. Id. at 2037.
30. Id.
31. See 18 U.S.C. §1151 (1994).
32. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1994).
33. Id.
34. Hagen v. Utah, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (relying on Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986)).
35. Hagen v. Utah, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992).
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appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari
to "resolve the direct conflict bewteen . . . the Tenth Circuit and the Utah
Supreme Court on the question of whether the Uintah Reservation had been
diminished.'
The Hagen Court found that under the General Allotment Act the President
of the United States was authorized to divide communally owned tribal lands
into individually owned parcels. 7 Land not conveyed to individual Indians
- surplus land - was then available for sale to non-Indians 8 Statutes
which authorized the sale of surplus Indian lands to non-Indians, however, did
not automatically diminish the reservation proper. The Supreme Court has
held that some surplus land acts diminished reservations, while other surplus
land acts did not. 9 To determine the effect of a particular act, a court must
look to the language of the statute in question, as well as to the circumstances
underlying the act's passage."
The United States Supreme Court structured its Hagen analysis under two
significant presumptions. First, that ambiguities are to be interpreted in favor
of Indians, and second, that the diminishment of Indian reservations is an
extreme measure, not to be taken lightly' The United States Supreme Court
then articulated three factors to consider in the determination of whether a
reservation has been diminished through a surplus land act.42
The critical factor to be considered is the specific language of the act
itself 3 The second factor requires a review of the historical text surrounding
the surplus land act." Finally, the analysis should consider the characteristics
of the people who populate the opened reservation lands 5
In Hagen, the United States Supreme Court reviewed legislation and
proposed legislation from as early as 1894. The Court found that in 1894 and
1898 Congress directed the President to facilitate allotment of the Uintah's
reservation lands.4 These allotment efforts were ineffective, as was a 1902
land act pertaining to the Uintahs. The 1902 Act4' authorized allotment of
the Uintah's land, but only upon approval of the adult male members of the
36. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 964.
37. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
38. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961 (citing DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432
(1975)).
39. Solem v. Bartlet, 465 U.S. 463, 469 (1984).
40. Id. The relevant statute is Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263.
41. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961.
47. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263.
No. 2]
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Uintah tribe." The 1902 Act directed that lands not allotted by a specific
point in time were to be "restored to the public domain."4
The adult male members of the Uintah tribe never consented to allotment
of their land as provided in the 1902 Act. However, in 1903, the Supreme
Court decided Lonewolf v. Hitchcock,-' which provided a mechanism by
which reservation boundaries could be altered unilaterally by Congress.5
Within months of the decision, Congress ordered the Uintah lands to be
allotted unilaterally if the tribe did not consent to the allotments by June 1 of
that year. 2 Congress specified that unallotted lands would be opened to non-
Indians, as specified in the 1902 Act. A subsequent 1904 Act set aside funds
to be used in implementing the purposes of the 1902 Act. 3
Finally, in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation
which directed that the unallotted lands in what had been the Uintah
reservation were to be "restored to public domain." The proclamation ordered
that the lands were to be opened to settlement under general homestead and
townsite laws.'
The statutory references to the 1902 Act were significant to the Court's
analysis in Hagen. The Court's decision would depend in part on whether the
1905 Act, which successfully resulted in the allotment of the Uintah lands,
repealed the Act of 1902 by implication, or whether the provisions of the
1902 Act were incorporated into the 1905 Act. The 1902 Act referred to the
public domain, whereas the 1905 Act did not: if the Court accepted that the
text of the 1905 Act, without reference to the public domain, was not based
on the Act of 1902, the statutory language at issue would be much less clear.
Hagen argued that the Act of March 3, 190555 repealed or at least
superseded some parts of the 1902 Act, specifically the "restore to the public
domain" language. The Supreme Court disagreed with Hagen and stated
that the intent of the 1902 Act to diminish the reservation survived the
passage of the 1905 Act. 7 The Court pointed out that congressional action
subsequent to the 1902 Act referred to the 1902 statute.5 ' The 1905 Act was
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
51. Id. at 567-68.
52. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 998.
53. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 207.
54. Proclamation of July 14. 1905, 34 Stat. 3119, 3119-20.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069. The Act of 1905 deferred the opening time
of surplus reservation lands as specified in the 1902 Act.
56. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 967.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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also tied to the 1902 Act because the former dealt with the proceeds of the
sale of the unallotted lands as provided for in the latter."
Furthermore, in reviewing the historical evidence, the Supreme Court found
clear evidence that the 1905 Act did not repeal the 1902 Act.' The Supreme
Court relied on President Roosevelt's proclamation, in which he explained that
the 1902 Act restored the unallotted lands to the public domain and that the
subsequent acts including the 1905 Act extended the time for the opening of
the lands.6
The phrase "public domain" was also central to the Supreme Court's
analysis. The Hagen Court cited statutes enacted around the time of the 1902
Act as evidence that Congress considered Indian reservations as separate from
the public domain. 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court in Hagen held that any
unallotted reservation lands restored to the public domain "evidences a
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with the
continuation of reservation status." 3 In the view of the United States
Supreme Court, Congress intended that the 1902 Land Act would diminish the
Uintah Reservation.!
In continuing its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that the Uintah Valley
was populated predominately by non-Indians' and concluded that a finding
that the land in question was within Indian country would seriously burden the
administration of state and local government.' Moreover, the Supreme Court
found it significant that, since the time the reservation was first opened to
non-Indian settlement, the State of Utah has exercised jurisdiction over the
opened parts of the Uintah Valley.67 The Supreme Court held that
demographics, combined with the State's long term exercise of jurisdiction,
demonstrated a "practical acknowledgment" that the reservation was
diminished.' Consequently, the State of Utah properly exercised criminal
jurisdiction for acts allegedly committed in the town of Myton, located
beyond the boundaries of Indian country.'
59. Id. at 967-68.
60. Id. at 969.
61. Id. at 969-70.
62. Id. at 966.
63. Id. at 967.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 970.
66. Id. (citing Solem v. Bartlet, 465 U.S. 463, 471-72 n.12 (1984)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 970-71.
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